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Benesch: Comparative Logics and the Comparative Study of Civilizations

COMPARATIVE LOGICS AND THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CIVILIZATIONS

WALTER BENESCH
Introduction
The following paper reflects two concerns: The first is with the
nature of human awareness in the world of which we are aware. It
is clear that world and awareness cannot be distincdy separated from
one another, except perhaps metaphorically. But it is equally clear
that these different aspects of common experience are different
aspects.
My second concern is with different logics both as these reflect
attempts to relate world and awareness in various cultures, and as
they can be used to critically examine the perspectives from which
we undertake any comparative study of civilizations.
Within the framework of these two concerns, I shall present
what I consider some of the most important epistemological problems implicit in relating the potential for experience to the objects of
experience, as well as approaches to these problems by four oriental
and occidental systems. In each case I will suggest possibilities for
logical syntheses as well as potential applications to the comparative
study of civilizations.
Problems
1. Civilization is a mental state, a state of mind, regardless of
how one may otherwise define it. Perhaps the Jain position that
the basic characteristic of Jiva or soul is the "potential for consciousness or attention,"1 expresses this idea most clearly.
Most Indian systems in general and the Jain in particular discuss the difficulties that arise when being aware is mistaken for the
objects of awareness. This insight is found in the "Tat tvam asi" of the
Upanisads,2 the Taoist proposition that the "Tao of which one can
speak is not the Tao,"5 the Confucian concern with "rectification
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of names," Socrates knowing that he does not know, the Copper Eskimo's awareness that the dancing bear is not the bear dancing. And
one finds it in different approaches to approximation and modeling in modern physical and social science, from Goedel's incompleteness theorem, to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. The mathematician, Jacob Bronowski, wrote:
. . . it is not possible for the brain to arrive at certain knowledge. All
those formal systems, in mathematics and physics and the philosophy of
science, which claim to give foundadons for certain truth are surely
mistaken. I am tempted to say that we do not look for truth, but for
knowledge. But I dislike this form of words, for two reasons. First of all,
we do look for truth, however we define it; it is what we find that is
knowledge. And second, what we fail to find is not truth but certainty;
the nature of truth is exacdy the knowledge that we do find.4

2. One of the most important aspects of human awareness is
that it is always potential awareness of awareness. It is this potential which distinguishes human consciousness from the sense consciousness which we share with other living organisms—and I am
quite aware that any statement about other organisms is made in
my contexts, not theirs. Questions as to where or how such awareness occurs, are ultimately irresolvable for such questions already
presuppose this potential.
3. It is human awareness of awareness which enables w/man 5 to
convert awareness into meaning. I would define knowing as this
conversion process from awareness/perception/cognition to meaning/objects of awareness/concepts of recognition. This conversion begins in the human ability to re-cognize in symbols, and it is
expressed in rituals, rites, theories, explanations, speculations, laws
of nature, etc. The conversion of awareness into meaning is the
essence of the artistic, religious, philosophical and scientific speculation in any tradition. As the Buddhist might say, it forms the
webs with which w/ man connects the points of human experience.
It is the maps w/man maps to trace both personal lifetimes and
ages.
4. The conversion of awareness into meaning is a process with
two complementary aspects: (1) It enables us to create the institutions, values, and systems of explanation within which we individually and collectively live and move and have purpose, but (2) it
also enables us to an awareness that these institutions, values and
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systems of explanation within which we live and find purpose, in
turn live and have purpose only in us. We conceive our concepts,
and conceive ourselves conceptually. On the one hand we define
the world, and on the other we are aware of ourselves via these
definitions. In a sense we are always lifting ourselves by our own
pants seats.
5. This awareness of inside/outside, definer/defined, creates an
instability at the core of all stability. But it is also the potential
source of creative change in the lives of individuals and collectives
where it expresses itself in the truths of paradox and the paradoxes
of truths. Niels Bohr is said to have divided truths into two sorts,
trivial ones where opposites are clearly absurd, and profound truths,
which are recognized by the fact that their opposites also are profound truths. Chuang Tzu's butterfly dream expresses this paradox
in one way as it is reflected in the life of the individual.6 Galileo's
two laws of motion express it in another way as the relative condition of our experience of the world.7 All of these paradoxes are
implicit in the comparative study of civilizations for any such study
presupposes certain definitions as fixed points.
Solutions
The systems w/man has used to accommodate the paradoxes
identified above are many and complex, and I will limit my discussion to those which have a bearing upon the logics to be presented in the final section of my paper:
1. Extrinsic dualism (L. "from without") . . . This is the position
that there are, extrinsic to human consciousness, two qualitatively
different realities or worlds. In part this is the Pre-Socratic Greek
view of a real world and an apparent world. It is found in Plato's and
Aristotie's approaches to universals and particulars. And in the synthesis of Greek and Christian thought, it is the absolute dualism
of creator vs. creation/createe, in which the Platonic/Aristotelean
universals tend to become the ideas in the mind of a deity....
These ideas, or laws of nature can be discovered by reason, sense
experience, intuition, or provided by revelation; but in any case
their meaning and truth is external to any particular reasoner,
perceiver, etc. The mind is either a blank at birth (Aristode), or
full of forgotten images, to be recalled later in life (Plato) ,8 In
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extrinsic dualism answers precede questions and determine their
relevance and significance. Some version of existence and substance
as pre-conceptual usually defines both concept and conceiving—this
has produced a centuries long argument over freedom vs determinism/pre-destination, in religion, science, philosophy, etc. In
extrinsic dualism, all problems of awareness, including awareness
of being aware, are to be resolved in an appeal to either the object world, or to objective and universal reason structures.
2. Intrinsic dualism (L. "from within") . . . This position holds
that innate and implicit in human nature and experience, as in
the world itself, there are two absolutely different qualitative essences . . . one of which is the source of the material or physical
aspects of human experience, the other is the source of human
awareness of the material and physical aspects. All things are an
unmixed mixture of these different essences. One analogy often used
to explain the idea of unmixed mixture is that of the combination
of oil and water, in which a temporary union appears to occur.
Two of the most important systems of intrinsic dualism are those of
the Samkhya and the Jaina.9 Awareness of objects and awareness
of being aware, reflect the synthesis that is w/man's nature, and is
to be accommodated and incorporated into all thinking.
3. Situational pluralism . . . This is the position of the early Indian Buddhists who chose a middle path between the perceived
nihilism of extreme materialism, and the soul theory of other
schools, including the spiritual pantheism of the Vedantins. The
Buddhists see the world as it is experienced in the moments of
particular situations. There is no pre-existing object world which
produces appearances, and there is no pre-existing subject consciousness which is aware of these appearances. There is only
experience which is always an immediate synthesis of appearance
and awareness. The source of what appears to be mental continuity
as well as physical continuity is memory. But memory too is only
recalled immediate experience.10 Thus to know is to relate the
recognized known to the situation/s in which it was cognitively
encountered. The relationship of awareness of world to awareness
of awareness is an aspect of relating in experience cognition and
re-cognition. The relationship is that there is no relationship apart
from perception and memory.
4. Complementary continuum (complement—"something that fills
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up, completes, or makes perfect," and continuum—"something
absolutely continuous and homogeneous of which no distinction
of content can be affirmed except by reference to something
else . . . something in which a fundamental common character is
discernible amid a series of insensible or indefinite variations)."1
. . . Although these two terms have in one sense a common meaning, I would use them here to emphasize two ideas central to the
Chinese philosophical tradition, i.e. that there is a fundamental
process, the TAO, which is continuous in all difference and distinction, and that all distinctions and differences in this totality are
necessarily mutually completing.12
In such a view, the human intellect is potentially capable of
functioning on three levels of awareness: (a) as an active participant in the world process, (b) as a passive manifestation itself of
the world process, and (c) beyond activity and passivity, aware of
(a) and (b).1'
Logics
A logic arises in a tradition as a way of relating ideas and experiences, and as such reflects its heritage. One culture may emphasize certain spiritual aspects of human experience, e.g. the "potential for attention" as in the world view of the Jainas. Another
culture, as in the case of the occidental, may stress the increasingly abstract objects of attention and thought—things or events whose
essences it is assumed are constant and unchanging, as in the Platonic "forms," the Aristotelean universals, or the structures themselves as in modern symbolic logics. The Chinese logicians, Hui
Shih and Kung-sun Lung Tzu, present a more intuitive synthesis
of these poles of attention and its objects. This would seem to be
the meaning of the Chinese logicians statement: "A chicken has
three legs."14
Any given logic does more however, than reflect its tradition, it
also reinforces that tradition's way of thinking in that it both represents and sets rules and standards. These two aspects of various
logics have historically proven to be one of the major obstacles to
cross-cultural understanding and to the study of comparative logics. All too often comparisons are made on the basis of some system's assumption that its approach is the only logical way. Thus
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other logics are squeezed into a Procrustean bed in which what is
seen as deficiency is rejected or ridiculed, what is seen as surplus
is simplified or deleted. The English materialist, Thomas Hobbes'
observations are fairly representative of this perspective at its most
conservative:
The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam
how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight. . . And therefore in geometry, which is the only science that it has pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind, men begin at setding the significations of
their words, which they call definitions and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.15

By way of illustration of the thesis that there are many logics
and that these logics reflect different origins and therefore serve
different purposes and cannot be reduced to any single logic, I
will schematize four that I feel are of particular significance to all
pursuit of knowledge:
OBJECT LOGICS
The best illustration of object logic are Greek syllogistic and
propositional logics and modern symbolic logics. These are systems within which the function of logic is to organize objectively
thinking and statements about the world, without reference to the
reasoning/thinking subject. The word object comes from the Latin: ob—"in the way," and jacere—"to throw." Objectification rests
upon three fundamental presuppositions:
1. There is an independent entity or process—including reasoning process—which possesses its own nature and identity, regardless of human perceptions and interpretations of it. In the
object tradition, objectification was and is often accomplished by
means of axiomatization, i.e., the assertion of a definition which
is itself unprovable, assumed to be true or primary, and the source
of other statements/theorems, whose truth/operations, etc. depend upon its acceptance and application. In modern symbolic
logics, the requirement for axioms which establish a deductive
system is that they be independent (not reducible to others), consistent (non-contradictory), and complete (adequate to the task
they are to perform).
2. There is a limit to questions, knowledge, and description—
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this is provided by the identity and nature of whatever is objectified—whether sense experience, a thinking process as in logical
form, or a symbol system.
3. Objectification is positive, i.e. an affirmation of specific properties, qualities, signs, entities, etc.—here is where both existence
and substance play critical roles, for they are the ultimate affirmations, i.e. "is" and "is substantive"—it is this which is the source of
noun forms and the variables of both class and propositional logics.
In the object tradition one often thinks of objects as entities,
(ens, from esse—"to have being, to be, to exist"). An object in this
sense is in the external world—something of which one is aware.
A civilization too can be treated as an object in this sense and can
be compared with other such objects. Zeno of Elea (5th Century
BC) claimed that if something is added to or substracted from
some other thing, and this other thing is neither increased nor
decreased thereby, then the first thing is nothing. This proposition conceals a problem which frequendy resurfaces in the object
tradition when it comes to deciding whether mental events and
ideas exist or exist as other than physical entities? In the comparison of civilizations from this perspective, one would comapre
physical events and manifestations, but not mental states—especially
the mental state within which one was comparing.
For most of the early Greek philosophers and scientists, the world
was a collection of objects possessing properties and qualities. Some
of these objects were particular and seemed to change, to come
and go. Their objective essence and first principle/s, however, were
considered universal and unchanging. Thus one of the problems
in modern and classical object logic is the presence of paradox.
It was Parmenides, a Greek philosopher of the Fifth Century
BC, who probably first equated being=thought=language, and thus
prepared the way for objectification of all three, individually and
collectively. In modern social science and education one observes
the reasoning process via tests, questionnaires, etc., as objectively
as does the natural scientist via equipment and gauges view objectively the natural world. In later Christian theology, the deity will
be conceived as the author of this tri-part objectification.
Three traditional approaches to objectification are woven
through the occidental tradition: (1) that the objectified is inter-
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nal and intuitive, e.g. Plato, Brouwer, Ushenko, and Heyting, (2)
that the objectified is external and arrived at via sense data, e.c.
Aristode, and John Stuart Mill, and (3) the objectified is nominal,
i.e. names and signs, e.g. Ockham, Carnap, Hilbert, Russell, etc.
Each of these positions implies a slightly different objective approach
to the study of social science and culture in general and civilizations in particular.
SUBJECT LOGICS
The logic of the Jain school is a superb example of a comprehensive system of subject logic in which one of the functions of
the logic is to identify and incorporate the "points of view" from
which thinking and statements about experience are made. In this
logic, the reasoner's position is implicit or explicit in all reasoning.
The Jain logic incorporates two techniques nayavada and syadvada. The techniques reflect two different approaches to knowledge, and they clearly indicate that one is not dealing with "subject" in the sense of "subjective " as it is used in the object tradition.
Rather "subject" refers to awareness and attention, and thus to a
subject who is aware and attentive.
The two knowledge aspects of the Jain logic are NAY AY ADA,
the elimination of ignorance, and SYADVADA, the acquisition of
knowledge. The object tradition which focuses upon the objects
of knowledge may tend to see no distinction between these two
approaches, and thus equate them. Socrates however was clearly
aware of this distinction when "knowing many things," he realized
that wisdom consisted of "knowing that he did not know."
The difference between acquisition of knowledge and the elimination of ignorance is the difference between extrospection and
introspection—or as the Jain defines knowledge—understanding
of one's self as the source of attention and awareness, vs the contents and objects of awareness and attention. For the Jain, knowledge of the world is knowledge from a point of view. Implicit in
this position are two kinds of awareness: (a) awareness that knowledge is relative to a point of view, and thus awareness of this point
of view (subject knowledge), and (b) awareness of that which one
claims to know within this point of view (object knowledge). To
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understand and compare civilizations and cultures would be to
understand the point of view from which one would claim such
understanding—as well as the perspective from which one compares.
Another way to put this distinction might be to view it within
the context of question/answer relationships. To acquire knowledge is to learn answers. To eliminate ignorance is to eliminate
one's ignorance of the questions to which these answers are responses, and thus to know the contexts and points of view within
which these questions were/are asked. Such an approach leads to
acquisition of knowledge and elimination of ignorance in that it
places facts within the relative points of view which make them
facts. Acquisition of knowledge is world oriented, elimination of
ignorance is self-oriented. NAY AV ADA without SY ADV ADA is
either faulty reasoning or dogma, or both.
As a brief illustration of the Jain systems, I offer the following
seven well known steps of the SYADVADA. In these steps the relative nature of knowledge is preserved (non absolutism), while at
the same time the certainty of relative aspects of knowledge is
possible. Sayadvada permits us to link subjects and predicates in
statements in sequences, while at the same time emphasizing that
no particular subject-predicate combination is absolute or exists
by itself. Any proposition then has seven aspects or seven stages,
the truth of any one of which is restricted to that particular stage
and is not applicable to any other. Each stage represents a standpoint. The term "sayad" or "sayat" in Sanskrit has a number of
meanings and is usally translated with "relatively," or 'just in this
sense," or "let it be" or "it is thus." Each proposition in the seven
part series is preceded by some form of the term "sayat." In outline, the seven steps are as follows:
1. Sayat, (Relatively, from a point of view, just so) It is so that the
frog is a living organism. Here the frog is viewed by the biologist
according to its dynamic functioning.
2. Sayat, It is not so that a frog is a living organism. Here the
frog is viewed by the physicist or chemist in terms of its basic inorganic elements.
3. Sayat, It is both so and not so that a frog is and is not a living
organism. Here the views from #1 and #2 are combined and the
frog is both.
4. Sayat, A frog is indescribable. From this point of view, no
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statement is a frog and no number of statements about a frog
exhausts what a frog is.
5. Sayat, It is so that a frog is a living organism and it is indescribable From this view a frog is a living organism but is indescribable in the sense of #4.
6. Sayat, It is not so that a frog is a living organism and this fact
too is indescribable. Here the view combines #2 and #4.
7. Sayat, It is so and it is not so that a frog is a living organism
and in both cases is indescribable. Here the view combines #1, #2
and #4.
To understand the 7 part line of reasoning is to identify the sense
or aspect in which each sayat is applied—and then to understand
the implications of each succeeding sayat for those which preceded
and/or follow it. To illustrate the sequence more clearly we could
take an exercise that textbooks in semantics often use to show the
relativity of experience. If we take three basins of water, one hot,
one cold, and one half-way between—if we place our hands in
either extreme in turn before placing them in the medium bucket,
we will have the Jain sayadvada sequence. One can clearly apply this
seven-step technique to the events, forces, trends, etc. that are the
basic stuffs of the comparative study of civilizations.
SITUATIONAL LOGICS
Indian Buddhist logic is a logic in which one of the functions is to
incorporate the situations within which experiences occur and
statements are made, i.e. the situational combination of the one
who experiences at a given moment, as well as the world experienced. Here the logic incorporates the synthesis of cognition and
recognition, sense experience and imagination.
From both the world view and the theory of intellect in the
Buddhist logic, it follows that ideas and inferences of logic are the
products of imagination, however they have their origins in some
fashion in sense experience. Thus the comparison of cultures and
civilizations involves the synthesis of many situations—those in
which one acquires the information that makes re-cognition of a
civilization possible, and those within which one does the actual
comparing, e.g. the writing of books and presentation of scholarly
papers.
Inferences and statements are not copies of the world, nor is
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol27/iss27/5
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the validity/truth of either dependent upon objects or subjects.
Pure cognidon (sense impressions) cannot be false. One may
mistake a rope for a snake, but the error is within the understanding and interpretation of perception, not in perception itself. This
distinction is quite important, for it moves questions of true/false
from perception to conception. We cannot see what isn't there perceptually, on the other hand we always see what isn't there conceptually.
Inference does not relate our conceptions to our perceptions,
but rather conceptions to conceptions, ideas to ideas. Some ideas
are closer to actual experience than others, but the closer we are
to pure sensation, the less the intellect recognizes and names.
Inference arises at that point where we try to become involved in
justifications and explanations, to answer the question why or how
we know or assume. For the Buddhist, as for most other theories
of inference, inference must have at least three parts: a) subject,
b) predicate, and c) a reason or justification for associating the
subject and predicate the way we do in any particular case.
So far the Buddhist theory of inference is not too different from
that of the objectivist, except perhaps the emphasis given to imagination in the former and the emphasis usually placed upon the
objects of experience in the latter. However, there are two additional restrictions to Buddhist inference which distinguish it far
more sharply: Firsdy, because inference arises in imagination and
memory, there is a danger that it can become too removed from
the immediacy of changing experience, become static, seem to
take on a life of its own. Thus valid inferences must reflect or
correspond in some way to the momentary and dynamic nature
of the world. Secondly, one should distinguish between the immediate experiences which one has as an individual, and these experiences when they have been interpreted so that other individuals
can understand them vicariously.
To accommodate the first problem the Buddhist adds an example step to the logic. This fulfills the requirement that the moment
be incorporated into the line of reasoning. To accommodate the
second, the problems of vicarious vs. personal experience, the
Buddhist distinguishes between the nature of inference for oneself
and inference for others. "I know there is a fire on the mountain
because there is smoke there, and where there is smoke there is
fire, as in the kitchen, etc. The underlined portion of this inference
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is the example without which the proposition "where there is
smoke there is fire" is invalid. It is this example which forces us
back into specific situations, and at the same time makes it clear
upon what specific observations and situations, our generalizations
and definitions depend.
For the objectivist trying to translate a line of reasoning in which
this inductive example step is ignored, into Buddhist logic where
it is essential, one of the difficulties is remembering appropriate
and acceptable examples to indicate the situations upon which
the imagination is relying for its inferences. In studying and comparing civilizations and cultures this step requires that all abstractions upon which such comparisons are based must be related back
to the specific experiences from which they have arisen as interpretations of events.
A further modification of the example step insists that one must
supply both positive and negative examples as well, for as Buddhist knowledge theory has it, we know what something is only
when we also know what it is not. Anyone who has ever tried to
identify something he or she knows with a positive and then negative list is probably aware, that the positive list is easier. In our
above example of the fiery mountain and smoke, the negative
example given by the Buddhist would run as follows "and where
there is no smoke, there is no fire, as in the case of a lake, etc."
The other element of inference upon which I would like to touch
is the difference between "inference for self and inference for
other." In the experience of the individual, immediate cognition
in a situation is internal and non-verbal. It is the source of genuine knowledge and helps us to survive and interpret the moment.
Once we have experienced the moment, interpreted it, and verbalized it, we are beyond immediate experience and increasingly
into the problems of concept, i.e. desire to convince, etc. As a
result the structure of inference for others possesses a very different form—one which at its best is designed to both convince and
to call attention to the moment in which the experience which is
now vicarious, was original. Inference for one's self emphasizes
cognition and discovery, inference for others emphasizes re-cognition and communication.16
The inference in inference for se^and inference for others, is of
three sorts for the Buddhist—categorical or identity inference, cans-
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al inference, and negative inference. In the first sort we establish
something's identity, in the second we establish its causes, and in
the third we establish what it is not and/or what did not or cannot
cause it.
ASPECT LOGICS

Chinese systems, especially as a synthesis of Taoist and Confucian/
Neo-Confucian philosophies, provide the basis for what I would
call aspect logics, i.e. systems of thought which incorporate both
contradiction and non-contradiction. These are logics which make
distinctions and at the same time incorporate insight into the distinctions from which these distinctions have been made. Such an
approach is most closely approximated in the west in the concern
with meta, meta-meta, meta-..n languages and logics. It has become increasingly clear that any logical system has both an inside
and an outside. Chinese logics provide techniques for reasoning
both in and about the world, and in and about reasoning systems.
Thus complementarity/paradox is either implicit or explicit in
them.
These logics might be viewed, in a sense, as a synthesis of basic
aspects of the other three systems—though developing historically, independendy from them. For the comparative study of civilizations and cultures, these are logics which developed from the
insight that any statement about either a culture or civilization is
made within a culture and civilization, and that its author is responsible for an awareness of the synthesis of about and in which
has made the statement itself possible.
Aspect logic is an inferential vehicle, not for formally relating
classes and signs, but for relating aspects of knowledge and understanding, as these develop in a dynamic dialectic of Way, Mind,
Knowledge, and Attitude. In this tradition when we use logic as a
knowledge technique, we are not relating classes but aspects of
thinking and awareness. I see no conflict between a propositional
logic and an aspect logic. They complement one another. To
understand propositional logic, one must view it from aspects
which are not and cannot be formalized. One of the great uses of
aspect logic is that it enables us to understand and utilize the precision and efficiency which propositional logic can offer.
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The logical techniques of the Chinese epistemological tradition
are analogies, metaphors, stories, aphorisms, and admonitions,
etc. Within these techniques certain inferential aspects are always
involved and I would suggest there is a core of at least six such
aspects which forms a common and consistent inferential system:
1. An aspect of naming. It is this which is reflected in the Chinese
concern for "rectification of names." Hsun Tzu felt:
Names have no intrinsic reality. One agrees to use a certain name and
issues an order that it shall be applied to a certain reality, and if the
agreement is abided by and becomes a matter of custom, then it may be
said to be a real name."

2. An aspect of distinguishing. In every set of inferences in aspect
logic there is a distinguishing aspect. To make distinctions is to
concentrate attention upon similar and dissimilar aspects of experience. However to focus upon similarities is to place out of focus
an equal or greater number of dissimilarities between and among
actual experiences, and vice versa. To gain is to lose. To distinguish also implies to create a distinction which is other than that
which is being distinguished, e.g. the definition of true is not true,
the distinction of color is not colored. Thus every distinction presupposes a second distinction which is outside the first distinction
and is its source.
3. An aspect of double negation. In every inference in aspect logic
there is an aspect of negating negation. This aspect is essentially
complementary to the aspect of distinction. For example, if Tao
cannot be divided, named, and distinguished, then to do so when
we speak and think (in fact we must do so when we think and
speak) is to negate the essence of its nature. However, to assure
that this negation does not in turn become an affirmation, it too
is negated. A similar example can be found in western monotheism when the theologian asserts that nothing can be said about
God, and that this statement itself says nothing about God.
4. An aspect of self-awareness. It is this aspect of inference which
reflects the sense of choice and responsibility in Chinese aesthetic
and ethic. But its consequences go beyond ethic and aesthetic, for
it also means the thinker chooses or has chosen the names and
distinctions upon which s/he focuses. Perhaps no other tradition
has placed so much emphasis upon the ideal, as the sage whose
mind is both full and empty, and it is this self-awareness aspect of
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inference which keeps the mind aware of its relationship to thought
content.
5. An aspect of limit. This aspect reflects the practical and pragmatic side of all inferential knowledge. It is, as Hsun Tzu tells us,
the essence of concentration: "As a basis for action, diversity is
impractical. Hence the wise man selects one thing and unifies his
actions about it." He felt that "Learning must always have a stopping place."18
6. An aspect of volition. Any line of inference has a volitional aspect
That is, any inference expresses an attitude which reflects the like
and dislikes of the reasoner who has chosen to think and express
himself in a certain way. As Hsun Tzu wrote of the mind:
Of its own volition it prohibits or permits, snatches or accepts, goes or
stops.. . . What it considers right it will accept; what it considers wrong
it will reject . . . Inevitably it will see things for itself.19

If we combine these aspects into a logical systsem, we can say
that the meaning as well as the nature of any inference is a synthesis of these aspects, and to understand it, agree or disagree with it,
prove or disprove it, will in turn involve us in a limidess sequence
of inferences utilizing these very same aspects—though the interpretations processed through the aspects may vary.
Conclusion
If one applies these four systems to the study of and resulting
statements about and commentaries upon civilizations, we can see
that each emphasizes a different ingredient in the knowing process—from the civilizations compared, to the point of view from which
the comparisons are made, to the situation within which they occur, to the aspects that have been selected for comparison—and,
of course, each of diese as they apply to the individual who would
compare.
University of Alaska
Fairbanks, Alaska
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NOTES
1. Griddhrapinchchacharya Sri Umaswawmi Maharaj: Tatvartha
Sutram, "Sutra 4," Barrister Champat Rai Jain Trust, Delhi, 1956.
2. Tat tvam asi: T h a t art thou." This is the succinct expression of
spiritual monism or pantheism of the Upanisads. See especially the
Chandogya Upanisad, vi.ix-xiii.
3. Opening line of the first chapter of Lao Tzu: The Tao te Ching.
4. Bronowski, Jacob: The Identity of Man, The Natural History Press,
Garden City, N.Y., 1965, p. 36.
5. "w/man" and "s/he"—these two terms are my solution to the awkward use of "man or woman" and "he or she," when the collective, genderless noun or pronoun is intended.
6. "Once Chuang Chou dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting
and fluttering around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He
didn't know he was Chuang Chou. Suddenly he woke up and there he
was, solid and unmistakable Chuang Chou. But he didn't know if he was
Chuang Chou who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Chuang Chou." Watson, Burton (trans.) The Complete Works of
Chuang Tzu, Columbia University, New York, 1968, p. 49.
7. In The Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, Galileo has
his hero, Salviati explain: "Motion, in so far as it is and acts as motion,
to that extent exists relatively to things that lack it; and among things
which all share equally in any motion, it does not act, and is as if it did
not exist Thus the goods with which a ship is laden leaving Venice, pass
by Corfu, by Crete, by Cyprus and go to Aleppo. Venice, Corfu, Crete,
etc. stand still and do not move with the ship; but as to the sacks, boxes
and bundles with which the boat is laden and with respect to the ship
itself, the motion from Venice to Syria is as nothing, and in no way alters
their relation among themselves. This is so because it is common to all
of them and all share equally in it. If, from the cargo in the ship, a sack
were shifted from a chest one single inch, this alone would be more of
a movement for it than the two-thousand-mile journey made by all of
them together." Galialaeo Galilei: A Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief
World Systems—Ptolemaic and Copernican, Stillman Drake Trans, U of
California Press, Berkeley, 1967, p. 116.
We can reduce Galileo's ideas to the following two laws of motion:
Relative motion (in systems) is "absolute," and absolute motion (between and
among systems) is "relative. "In these two principles we have the essence of
"living in world views" that in turn "live in us."
8. This in part accounts for the hostility in the occidental tradition
toward both the sophists and skeptics, e.g. Protagoras' proposition that
"man is the measure of all things, of things that they are, and of things
that are not that they are not"; or Gorgias' three tenets: a. there is nothing, b. if there were something we could not know it, and c. even if we
could know it, we could not communicate it.
9. The Samkhya developed a dualistic theory of evolution which ac-
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counts for both the physical world, prakriti, and consciousness, purusa.
This solves the problem of explaining the mental/spiritual evolution of
evolutionary theory itself, that haunts western monistic materialism.
"All experience is based on the duality of the knowing subject, purusa,
and the known object prakriti. Prakriti (usually translated "Nature") is
the basis of all objective existence, physical and psychical. . . .
"The evolution of unconscious prakriti can take place only through
the presence of conscious purusa." Sarvepalli Raldhakrishnan &
Charles Moore: A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, Princeton, 1973, p.
424.
The Jain dualism is quite different, encompassing two qualitatively
unique kinds of atoms—Jiva, which is spirit and whose basic characteristic is the potential for consciousness, and Ajiva, which is the physical
source of the objects of experience, much as developed in the Greek/
modern occidental tradition.
"The category of Ajiva is divided into matter (pudgala), space
(akasha), motion (dharma), rest (adharma) and time (kala). . . . An
atom (anu) is supposed to be the smallest part of matter which cannot
be further divided." Chandradhar Sharma: A Critical Survey of Indian
Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, 1973, pp. 63-4.
In both of these systems knowledge of the world and its explanation
represents some intrinsic synthesis in human thought of matter and
consciousness. The Jain have no deities, and the deities found in
Samkhya in no way alter its basic view of purusa/prakriti. Thus in both of
these systems any claim to "know the world" must accommodate both
"knowing" as a characteristic of a subject consciousness, and the
"known" as an aspect of the non-conscious, object world.
10. Thus the fundamental framework for all experience is a synthesis
of immediate cognition with memory which produces what we call "recognition." The Buddhist position at this stage is quite close to both the
extreme empiricism of Hume and the modern occidental existentialists. The Buddhists, as does Hume, suggest that we tend to stabilize the
constandy changing dynamic of experiences via concepts and language
constructs. The negative theory of concept formation of Apoha is an
excellent illustration of this insight, and differs radically from the positive principle of the passive/active intellect found in Aristotle.
11. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1970.
12. "The Chinese principle of complementarity arises in change, and
via change, in non-being. The way in which something is at a given
time—if existence is change or process—is relative to change, i.e. nonbeing. This idea of complementarity is quite different from that in the
west which builds its logical foundations upon a principle of unchanging existence, with the two absolute values of "existence/non-existence." If things change, they do so within the framework that "things
exist" and not that "existence is things." The experience of "changing
things" will have very different implications within these two possibilities, and in the Occident complementarity is lost in the principles of
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non-contradiction and excluded middle. In the Taoist view the "ten
thousand things" are constantly coming into and going out of being—
here the principle of complementarity occurs in non-being." Benesch,
Walter & Krejci, Rudolph, An Introduction to Logics, U. of Alaska, 1985,
p. 58.
13. The great contemporary Chinese thinker, Fung Yu-lan expressed
it thusly:
" . . . The totality that lies in one's thought does not include the
thought itself. For it is the object of the thought and so stands in contrast to it. Hence the totality that one is thinking about is not actually
the totality of all that is. Yet one must first think about totality in order
to realize that it is unthinkable. One needs thought in order to be conscious of the unthinkable, just as sometimes one needs a sound in order
to be conscious of silence. One must think about the unthinkable, yet
as soon as one tries to do so, it immediately slips away. This is the most
fascinating and also most troublesome aspect of philosophy." Fung Yulan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, Free Press, New York, 1966, p.
337.
14. Wing-Tsit Chan: A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton,
1973, p. 234.
15. Hobbes, Thomas, "Leviathan" in Great Books of the Western World,
Britannica Press, 1952, vol. 23, pp. 54-56.
16. Stcherbastsky, Th.: Buddhist Logic, Dover Publications Reprint,
New York, 1962, vol. I p. 65, vol. II, pp. 47-50.
17. Watson, Burton, (trans)., Hsiin Tzu, Basic Writings, Columbia University, 1963, p. 114.
18. Watson, Burton (trans.): The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Columbia University, 1968, p. 130 and p. 135-6.
19. Ibid., p. 129.
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